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Abstract
This paper studies a market for a medical product in which there is perfect competition
among health insurers, while the good is sold by a monopolist. Individuals di¤er in
their severity of illness and there is ex post moral hazard. We consider two regimes:
one in which insurers use coinsurance rates (ad valorem reimbursements) and one in
which insurers use copayments (specic reimbursements). We show that the induced
equilibrium with copayments involves a lower producer price and a higher level of wel-
fare for consumers. This results provides strong support for a reference price based
reimbursement policy.
JEL Codes: I11, I13, I18.
Keywords: ex post moral hazard, health insurance competition, copayments, imper-
fect competition.
1 Introduction
Following Feldstein (1970, 1973) and later on Feldman and Dowd (1991), there is a
common view among economists that insurance coverage is too large when (i) the market
for health insurance is perfectly competitive and (ii) there is imperfect competition
among health care providers.
The reason underlying this result is that competitive insurers do not internalize the
e¤ect of their insurance policy on the pricing of medical goods. As a result, prices set
under monopoly or oligopoly are too high in equilibrium, and there is room for limiting
insurance coverage. In an environment with ex post moral hazard and linear reimburse-
ment rates, this point has been proved rst by Chiu (1997) for the case where demand
for health care is perfectly (or su¢ ciently) inelastic, and later by Vaithinianathan (2006)
who allows for elastic demand (but considers Cournot competition). In both papers in-
surers cover a share of expenditures so that the reimbursement is proportional to the
price.
In this paper, we re-consider the same game between insurers and a monopolistic
health provider, but allow for two types of copayments used by insurers. In a rst case,
denoted A, insurers use ad valorem copayment rates (also called coinsurance rates),
that is copayment rates that are proportional to the value of health care consumed
by the patient. This is the type of reimbursement considered in the papers mentioned
in the previous paragraph. In a second case, referred to as S, insurers use specic
copayments, that is copayments that are proportional to the quantity consumed by the
patient, but do not depend on the price. In both scenarios, the equilibrium concept
is the same. As in the aforementioned papers, insurers compete by choosing a level of
premium and a level of copayment for a given price of the medical product while the
monopolist chooses its price taking as given the insurance policy chosen by insurers and
both markets equilibrate simultaneously.
The medical product cum insurance markets we consider can be interpreted in two
ways. The monopolistic producer is viewed as private and prot maximizing either way.
As to the insurers, one can assume rst that they are private and prot maximizing and
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that there is free entry and perfect competition in the insurance market. In equilibrium
and absent of adverse selection the equilibrium contract then maximize consumers
expected utilities. The role of regulation is conned to the specication of the type of
reimbursement (A or S) rule that is used. This is the main interpretation adopted for
the writing of this paper.
Alternatively on could assume that there is a single public and welfare maximizing
insurer but that it can only commit to the type of rule that is used and not to the
specic levels of reimbursement rates. Formally, both interpretations yield exactly the
same game and thus the same results.
The main result of this paper is that under very general specication of individual
preferences, the level of individualswelfare is strictly higher when insurers compete
on copayment rates as opposed to coinsurance rates. Our result stems from the fact
that for a given copayment level paid by the insuree, the producer price chosen by a
monopolist will be lower under specic reimbursement.
The following three papers are the most closely related. In the rst of these papers
Gaynor et al. (2000) show that a lower producer price of medical good is always welfare
superior, even if there is ex post moral hazard. Second Lakdawalla and Sood (2013),
show that if the monopolist moves rst and uses general non linear prices, the outcome of
the market can lead to the same level of insurance coverage as under perfect competition,
but in which the entire surplus is absorbed by the monopolist. Their result however
rests on the strong assumption that the monopolist can choose both quantity and price.
Finally, Cremer et. al. (2016) consider a setting in which a public insurer moves rst.
They show that a suitable regulation of the copayment instruments leads to the same
reimbursement rule as under perfect competition for medical products. In contrast to
these two latter contributions, we study the equilibrium of a market in which neither the
insurance companies nor the provider of the medical good can commit to their policy,
so that the equilibrium of the market is a Nash equilibrium in which insurers choose
their insurance policy for a given price of the medical good and the monopolist chooses
its price for a given level of insurance policy.
By analogy with the industrial economics literature one can think of Cremer et. al.
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(2016) as a setting where the regulator or national insurer is a Stackelberg leader with
full commitment power. In the current model, commitment is limited and when it comes
to the level of reimbursement the insurer is simply a Nash competitor. While Cremer
et. al. (2016) and Lakdawalla and Sood (2013) are useful as normative benchmark it
is known from the regulation literature that commitment to specic levels such as caps
on prices is di¢ cult to enforce in a credible way (because the outcome is not subgame
perfect and the both parties would benet from renegotiation). Consequently, this
paper and our earlier one are complementary and interestingly, while the specication
of the game di¤ers both yield similar results in that they point to the superiority of
copayments (per unit reimbursement) over ad valorem rules.
Our results are consistent with the empirical literature. Specic copayments can
indeed be interpreted as reference pricing. In its extreme form, the reference pricing
mechanism sets a xed level of reimbursement per unit of product. Above this level, the
patient pays the di¤erence between the producer price and the xed level of reimburse-
ment. Recent evidence shows that the introduction of this policy yields a signicant
decrease in producer price (e.g., see Aouada et al (2019) or Whaley and Brown (2018)).
2 The Model
Consider a mass 1 of ex ante identical individuals whose exogenous income is w. Their





to G() with a density g(). The health state is iid. across individuals. Preferences
are represented by a Von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u  u (y ()), where
y = x + h (q; ). The variable x denotes consumption of a numeraire good, while q
represents the consumption of a medical product, which is sold by a monopolist at a
(producer) price of P . The function u is strictly increasing and strictly concave while
the function h is increasing and strictly concave in q but decreasing in . In words, a
larger  indicates a larger adverse health shock. We assume that @2h(q; )=@q@ > 0;
so that marginal benet of the medical product is increasing in the health risk.
The consumption of q is chosen ex post. Its cost may be covered by a health insurance
scheme, which can be seen as a partial subsidy on P . Concerning the reimbursement
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scheme, we consider two regimes, A and S. In regime A, the reimbursement rate chosen
by insurers is ad valorem. The insurance then covers a given share of Pq, the total
expenses on the medical product. Consequently, the out of pocket costs which represent
the remaining share are determined by an ad valorem copayment rate, denoted by
t, which in the health insurance literature is often referred to as coinsurance rate.
The consumer price is then given by ~PA = tP . In the second regime, referred to as
specic, the insurers reimburse a xed amount per unit. The reimbursement is simply
proportional to the quantity q but independent of the producer price P . In practice this
corresponds to the case where the reimbursement is based on an exogenous reference
price. Let c denote the per unit insurance coverage, so that the net (or consumer) price
of the medical product is given by ~PS = P   c. In the literature this is often referred
as copayment. Of course, as long as there is some insurance, t < 1 and c > 0.
To buy an insurance contract o¤ering a consumer price ~P for the medical product,
policyholders pay a premium .1 In state , the consumption of the numeraire good is
thus given by
x = w      ~Pq; (1)
where q denotes the consumption of the medical product in state . Expected utility




u (y ()) dG() =
Z

u(w      ~Pq + h (q; ))dG();
where E denotes the expectation operator over .
2.1 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows. In Stage 0 the regulator decides which regime A or
S insurers have to adopt. In Stage 1 insurers simultaneously choose the contract they
o¤er and which is bought by consumers, while the producer sets the price P . In Stage
2, the state of health is realized for each individual who choose the consumption of the
medical product q given the consumer price implied the insurance contract bought in
Stage 1.
1The superscript i = A;S is omitted when not necessary.
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To prepare the grounds for studying the Nash equilibrium of Stage 1, we rst study
the individuals ex post problem. Then we specify the strategies and payo¤s of the
insurers and the producer under each of the two regimes.
2.2 The individual problem




w      ~Pq + h (q; )
taking ~P and  as given. The rst-order condition with respect to q is given by
  ~P + @h(q; )
@q
= 0: (2)

























w      ~Pq + h (q ; )

stands for the level of indi-
















For future reference, the following lemma characterizes the consumption and utility
levels as a function of the health state.
Lemma 1 y is decreasing in  while q

 is increasing.
Proof. Di¤erentiation of y = w   ~Pq +h (q ; ) with respect to , while using

















where the sign of the RHS follows from our assumptions on h(q; ).
An individuals choices depend on the state of nature and on the consumer price.
They do not directly depend on the reimbursement regime that is adopted by insurers.
This reimbursement regime along with the producer price, P , determine the consumer
price, ~P , which is the only cost variable relevant to the consumer.
2.3 Insurers
Given that there is perfect competition in the insurance market, insurers will enter the
market as long as prots are positive. Consequently, the objective of a representative
insurer is to maximize the expected utility of the representative individual subject to the
break-even constraint. This condition requires that the premium equals the expected
cost of the insurance coverage so that the insurers expected prot is zero. We consider
a simultaneous game played by a representative insurers on the one hand and the mo-
nopolistic producer of the medical product on the other hand. The insurers strategy is
the vector f; tg in regime A and a vector f; cg in regime S. The monopolist chooses
the producer price P in either scenario. In regime A, a Nash equilibrium is triplet
P A; A; tA
	
so that each players strategy is the best- response to the other players
strategy. In regime S the equilibrium is described by

P S ; S ; tS
	
.
In regime A the best-response levels of premium and coinsurance rates are given
determined by














s.t.    (P   tP )Eq = 0:

(4)
In regime S we have


















The medical product is supplied by a prot maximizing monopoly. Denoting by k and F
respectively the marginal and the xed cost, which includes all the sunk costs incurred
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during the development of the medical product, the best-response producer prices in
the two regimes are determined by
P A (t) 

argmaxP  = (P   k)Q   F;




P S (c) 

argmaxP  = (P   k)Q   F;
s.t. Q = Eq (P   c)

(7)
3 The two regimes
Our main point is to show that policy holders have higher expected utility under regime
S than underA. Roughly speaking this is because it implies a lower equilibrium producer
price. We now turn to the study of the best-response functions. To compare expected
utility levels it is convenient to take a detour and characterize the combinations of
producer and consumer prices (P; eP ) that can be generated by the best responses both on
the insurers and on the producers sides. We represent these by the function eP (P )for the
insurer and P ( eP ) for the producer. While these are not strictly speaking best-response
functions, it is plain that their intersection corresponds to the Nash equilibrium levels.
3.1 The insurers best-response
Substituting t by ~P=P and c by P   ~P , the problem of the insurer as described by
(4) and (5) can be rewritten as the choice of an insurance package
n








argmax; ~P Eu =
R
 u(w      ~Pq

















This statement of the problem is valid in both regimes. Note that we do not change
the underlying strategic variables, which remain t or c. Substituting the break-even
constraint into the objective function, the problem reduces to choosing ~P (P ) so that











   ~Pq + h (q ; ))dG(); (9)
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   ~Pq + h (q ; )
i
= 0; (10)




















































Equation (11) implicitly denes the function ~P (P ) describing the set of pairs (P; eP )
which are compatible with a best-response strategy of the insurer. Recall that this
function is the same in the two regimes.
Lemma 2 We have ~P (P ) < P for any P .
Proof. The proof of follows immediately from Lemma 1. Since q is increasing in
 while y is decreasing in , cov (q

 ; u
0 (y)) > 0 because u" < 0. Equation (11) thus
yields ~P < P for any P .
Intuitively, Lemma 2 simply states that for any producer price, as long as consumers
are risk averse, the insurance contract always e¤ectively provides some insurance. To
see this note that in Regime S, ~P < P implies c = P  ~P > 0 while it yields t = ~P=P < 1
under Regime A. In other words, in both cases consumers do not pay the full cost of
their consumption of the medical product. While this result needs to be established to
ensure that our argument is consistent and complete, it does of course not come as a
surprise.
For the remainder of our arguments no monotonicity properties of ~P (P ) are needed.
And indeed without further restriction on u, ~P (P ) may or may not be monotonically
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increasing. This depends on the properties of the utility function. An increase in P is
e¤ectively like a decrease in income (via ) which has an ambiguous e¤ects the demand
for insurance. Under CARA for instance ~P (P ) is increasing.
3.2 The producers best response
While the regime has no impact on the insurers best-reply, it does a¤ect the pricing
behavior of the producer. Under regime A the FOC associated with (6) is given by
@A
@P
= Q(tP ) + t(P   k)@Q
(tP )
@ eP = 0; (12)
while that under regime S is given by
@S
@P
= Q(P   c) + (P   k)@Q
(P   c)
@ eP = 0: (13)
But this implies that when tP = P   c, so that ePA = ePS , it follows that when
@S
@P




as long as t < 1 (and prots are concave).2 So that dening PA( eP ) = P A  ~P=P and
PS( eP ) = P S  ~P   P we can state the following lemma
Lemma 3 For any given consumer price associated with t < 1 or c > 0 we have
PA( eP ) > PS( eP ).
To illustrate this property consider the case where the elasticity of the demand for
the medical product, " is constant. In that case problems (6) and (7) yield closed-form


























@ eP + (P   k)@
2Q( eP )




@ eP + (P   k)@
2Q( eP )
@ eP 2 < 0 (15)
is enough for concavity of prots in the two regimes (over the relevant range t < 1). Note that it is
























j"j < 0; (18)




, which from Lemma 2 must hold in equilibrium (which is on
the insurers best-response function). Observe that PS and PA intersect only at the 45
degree line, that is when t = 1 and c = 0. When there is no insurance both regimes
are equivalent. This is most obvious for the constant elasticity case, but it also follows
from (14) for the general case.
Intuitively Lemma 3 can be understood from the traditional ad valorem v. specic
tax incidence under monopoly. The traditional result is that for a given consumer
price the ad valorem tax yields the larger tax revenue and thus a smaller consumer
price. In our setting this comparison is reversed because taxes are negative; the
insurance payment is formally like a subsidy. Consequently, for a given consumer price
the ad valorem subsidy yields a larger producer price, which is exactly what is stated
in Lemma 3.
4 Nash equilibria and welfare
The two Nash equilibria are illustrated in Figure 1 for the special case where ~P (P )
is monotonically increasing, and where demand elasticity is constant. In this case,
Regime A yields both a larger producer price and a larger consumer price. However, the
comparison of consumer prices relies on the monotonicity of ~P (P ); a simple inspection
of the gure shows that when ~P (P ) is rst increasing and then decreasing the ranking
of consumer prices may be reversed.
The comparison of producer prices, on the other hand is robust. This follows from
a simple graphical argument, elaborating on Figure 1. The insurers best-response



















. This evidently remains true when ~P (P ) is
not monotonic.
This property has interesting implications for the welfare properties of the two
regimes. To see this let us return to the insurers problem as stated in 8. Recall
that due to competition in the insurance market the equilibrium contract maximizes
expected utility of the ex ante identical consumers subject to the constraint that the
premium covers expected reimbursements. Now it follows from the envelope theorem
that the maximum level of expected utility that can be achieved decreases with the
producer price P . This in turn implies that Regime S yields a higher expected utility
level than Regime A. This establishes our main result summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The specic reimbursement regime S yields a lower producer price and
a larger expected utility than the ad valorem regime.
This result provides strong support for the use of reference pricing. Specic co-
payments can indeed be interpreted as a form of reference pricing with a xed level of
reimbursement per unit of the product.3 Above this level, the patient pays the di¤erence
between the producer price and the xed level of reimbursement.
5 Conclusion
To summarize, we have shown that when insurers compete using copayment rates rather
than coinsurance rates, the market equilibrium, in which the medical product is sold by
a monopolist, involves a higher level of welfare for consumers. Intuitively our results can
be understood from the traditional ad valorem v. specic tax incidence under monopoly.
The traditional result is that for a given consumer price the ad valorem tax yields the
larger tax revenue and thus a smaller consumer price. In our setting this comparison is
reversed because taxesare negative; the insurance payment is formally like a subsidy.
3This refers to case of an exogenous references price. Alternatively, and particularly in the case of
o¤-patent product for which there is competition (which is not the case in our paper) the reference price
can be endogenous and given for instance by the lowest price within a therapeutic class, see for instance
Danzon (2011).
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Figure 1: The Nash equilibria
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Consequently, for a given consumer price the ad valorem subsidy yields a larger producer
price.
Because a copayment rule is equivalent to a reimbursement based on a xed reference
price this results provides support for the use of reference pricing even in the context of a
monopoly. In practice reference pricing has been used typically for o¤-patent products
for instance in Germany, the Netherlands and New Zealand. The reference price is
then often endogenous and for instance given by the lowest price within a the relevant
therapeutic class. By contrast we have considered a product produced by a monopoly
thus assuming that patent protection has not expired so that to be relevant the reference
price has to be exogenous (or obtained by external benchmarking).
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